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1. Introduction  
The closely connected influences of demand and technological opportunities on the 
strategic decisions of firms to innovate and the aggregate outcomes of these decisions are 
well established subjects of research in innovation studies, since the seminal contribution of 
Schmookler (1966) and followed by a fierce debate among scholars in the field (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1979). A recent contribution (Di Stefano et al., 2012) reviews this debate by 
examining the evolution in this research, which has in turn come down in favour of either a 
technology-push or demand-pull source of innovation as it has sought to disentangle their 
relative importance in fostering innovation.  
Interestingly, no previous study has analysed the demand-pull perspective from the 
viewpoint of barriers to innovation. As is common within the innovation literature, analyses 
of the factors of innovation success are proportionally more numerous than studies of patterns 
of failure and the effect of the lack of incentives. As such, scholars of demand-pull 
perspectives seem to have overlooked lack of demand or demand uncertainty as factors 
hampering decisions to invest in innovation.  
The emerging literature on barriers to innovation has dealt primarily with the firms’ 
characteristics that affect their perception of barriers to innovation or, when specifically 
examining the actual hindrances of perceived barriers, it has paid a disproportionate amount 
of interest to financial barriers and limitations to the financial capacity of firms to invest in 
R&D (see D’Este et al., 2012, and Pellegrino and Savona, 2013, for a review of this 
literature). This bias toward financial obstacles might well reflect the relative “dominance” of 
technology-push perspectives over interest in demand-related incentives to innovate.  
Rather than contrasting the two perspectives empirically, here we seek to rebalance 
the overall picture by attempting to disentangle the effects of lack of demand, or perceived 
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uncertainty about demand conditions, on firms’ decisions to invest in R&D and the amount of 
resources they devote to the activity. The paper makes a number of contributions to the 
innovation literature: first, it adds to the recently renewed debate on demand-pull 
perspectives in innovation studies, by examining demand-related (i.e., lack of) incentives to 
invest in innovation. Second, it complements the emerging literature on barriers to innovation 
in two ways: on the one hand, by focusing on demand-related obstacles rather than on the 
more frequently explored financial barriers; and, on the other, by analyzing in detail whether 
experiencing demand-related obstacles is a sector-specific feature, that is, whether firms 
active in high- or low-tech manufacturing or in knowledge intensive or low-tech services are 
more or less dependent on demand conditions when deciding to perform R&D. 
We find that demand uncertainty and stagnancy are two quite distinct barriers, having 
substantially different effects on firms’ behaviour. We interpret this evidence in terms of the 
specific phase in the innovation cycle in which decisions to invest in R&D are formulated. 
While demand uncertainty has a weak, positive statistically significant effect on R&D plans, 
the perception of a lack of demand has a marked impact on not only the amount of 
investment in R&D but also the likelihood of firms engaging in R&D activities. Sectoral 
affiliation does not seem to be a factor in demand conditions, supporting the conjecture that 
positive expectations regarding market demand are a structural and necessary condition that 
has to be satisfied by all firms prior to deciding to invest in R&D. When considered from the 
perspective of barriers to innovation, demand-related incentives therefore seem to cut across 
sectoral specificities in technological opportunities.  
In the section that follows we briefly review the two branches of literature mentioned 
above: that is, studies comparing demand-pull vs. technology-push sources of innovation and 
analyses of barriers to innovation. Section 3 describes the data employed in the empirical 
analysis; Section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy and the variables used in the 
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estimations, while Section 5 discusses the results and provides a response to the main 
research question. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background literature 
2.1. Demand-pull perspectives revisited  
The innovation literature has traditionally been somewhat ambivalent with regard to 
the role of demand as an incentive to innovation, besides that of technological opportunities. 
As suggested by Di Stefano et al., (2012) in a recent review, the debate between demand-pull 
and technology-push perspectives has evolved through different stages, from the rigid 
adoption of opposing stances by the supporters of demand-pull (Schmookler, 1962, 1966; 
Myers and Marquis, 1969; von Hippel, 1978, 1982) and its critics (Mowery and Rosenberg, 
1979; Dosi, 1982; Kleinknecht and Verspagen, 1990) before settling, more recently, for a 
more balanced view which sees demand as a complementary (though not dominant) factor 
determining innovation. This body of literature includes both conceptual and empirical 
contributions (Cainelli et al., 2006; Piva and Vivarelli, 2007; Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008) as 
well as analyses conducted at both macro- and firm-levels.  
For the purposes of our discussion here, it should suffice to recall the main arguments 
in the debate, relate them to the most recent literature on barriers to innovation (Section 2.2) 
and formulate the conjectures (Section 2.3) that we then test empirically in the remaining of 
the paper.  
As Fontana and Guerzoni (2008) suggest, the intuition regarding the influence of 
demand on innovation was sparked by the seminal contributions of Schmookler (1962; 1966) 
and Myers and Marquis (1969), who claimed that the introduction of new products and 
processes is conditioned by the presence of demand or even possibly a latent demand and, in 
general, by positive expectations of profitability from returns to innovation. In the absence of 
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these conditions, firms would simply not have any incentive to innovate. Moreover, the 
adoption and diffusion of (especially new) products are intrinsically subject to uncertainty, 
which would further reduce incentives to innovate. The arguments forwarded by the 
proponents of technology-push sources touched upon various issues, ranging from the reverse 
causality of the empirical relationships estimated by Schmookler (1966) and Meyers and 
Marquis (1969) to the difficulties of identifying the relevant demand affecting innovation 
incentives.  
It is our contention, and one we come back to later, that market size – and therefore 
expectations regarding profitability – and demand uncertainty are very likely to refer to 
different levels of demand. First, positive expectations with regard to profitability and, hence, 
incentives to innovate, despite being intrinsically linked to the fate of the new product being 
launched, are affected primarily by the macro-conditions of aggregate demand and the market 
dynamism of the specific and related products. Even incremental product or process 
innovation would be hard to implement if forecasts of sales and returns to innovation were 
poor.  
Second, while uncertainty might be linked to aggregate macro-conditions of demand, 
it is predominantly affected by the characteristics of the new products/services and the lack of 
information on users and their capabilities to adopt/benefit from the new product (see also 
von Tunzelmann and Wang, 2003 on user capabilities).  
Of course, macro- and micro-demand conditions are likely to reinforce each other, 
though in the case of incremental product or process innovation, aggregate stagnancy of 
demand might be more influential, whereas in the case of radically new products or services 
it is the uncertainty that is likely to play a major role in terms of incentives to innovate (see 
also Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008).  
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2.2 Demand as a barrier to innovation: stagnancy and uncertainty  
Although the literature on barriers to innovation is relatively recent, scholars have 
found substantial evidence for the presence and effects of perceived hindrances on the 
propensity and intensity of engagement in innovation activities.  
A large proportion of these studies have focused their attention on analyses of the 
effects of financial constraints on firms’ cash flow sensitivity to afford R&D investments (for 
a review, see Schiantarelli, 1996; Hall, 2002; Bond et al., 1999; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012). 
Indeed, empirical evidence tends to confirm that encountering financial constraints 
significantly lowers the likelihood of firms engaging in innovative activities (Savignac, 
2008), with this pattern being more pronounced in small firms and in high-tech sectors 
(Canepa and Stoneman, 2007; Hall, 2008; Hottenrott and Peters, 2012).  
The implicit assumption behind this preferred focus of analysis is that it is essentially 
access to finance, financial uncertainty and information asymmetries that reduce the financial 
returns of R&D investments and the ability to attract external funds, thus reducing incentives 
to invest in R&D.  
A few recent contributions have extended the analysis to non-financial obstacles to 
innovation, drawing primarily on evidence from innovation surveys, which allow the effects 
of knowledge-related obstacles (e.g., shortage of qualified employees, lack of information on 
technology and markets), market-related obstacles (e.g., lack of customer interest in 
innovative products, markets dominated by large incumbents), and barriers attributable to the 
need to fulfil national and international regulations) to be examined. Moreover, these 
innovation surveys allow researchers to look beyond the mere decision to invest in R&D and 
to take into account innovation outputs, such as the introduction of a new (to the market or to 
the firm) good or service or a new process.  
6
  
Even within the CIS-based literature, an overwhelming number of contributions focus 
on the financial constraints to innovation, treating the role of non-financial constraints as a 
simple control factor (Tiwari et al., 2008; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2010; Blanchard et al., 
2013). Analyses of factors affecting the perception of all types of obstacles are provided, 
however, by Iammarino et al. (2009) and D’Este et al. (2008 and 2012). Pellegrino and 
Savona (2013) look at the effect of all types of barriers on the likelihood of being a successful 
innovator, recognizing the fundamental – possibly exacerbating – impact of other types of 
obstacles indirectly on the financial barriers and directly on the innovation intensity of firms. 
All these contributions point equally to the importance of the lack of access to finance and the 
lack of market responses to innovation.  
 
2.3 Main conjectures  
Overall, the implicit assumption behind the “bias” toward technology-push 
perspectives within the innovation literature is that firms plan their innovation investments in 
a context that is structurally and indefinitely capable of absorbing the outcomes of 
innovation, much in line with a blind trust in a sort of Say’s Law1 for innovative products. 
This would apply both at the general macro-economic level – that is, a general state of 
dynamism of aggregate consumption – and at the micro-level of analysis – that is, for the 
specific product/service/sector that has been introduced onto the market.  
Without seeking to test the technology-push and demand-pull hypotheses empirically, 
here we contest this assumption and claim that if easy access to finance and the availability of 
                                                 
1
 Put simply, Jean Baptiste Say claimed that “supply always creates its own demand” – i.e., markets are able to 
infinitely absorb any quantity of production. The Keynesian framework overall rejected Say’s Law. Here we 
might stretch the argument and argue that in the case of innovative products, the uncertainty of whether the 
launch of new products or services is going to be adopted by consumers and diffused in the markets is even 
higher than that affecting standard plans of production.  
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funds are important conditions to implement innovation investment plans, trust and positive 
expectations regarding the state of demand are necessary conditions for firms to enter the 
innovation contest and initiate innovation investment plans.  
Rather than focusing on market structure issues or “lack of customer interest”, we turn 
our attention to firms’ perception of the state of demand in terms of both the lack of demand 
tout court and market uncertainty. As far as the latter is concerned, we are aware that some 
scholars (see, for instance, Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011 and 2013) have analysed the effect of 
market uncertainty on R&D investment behaviour from a real option theory perspective, 
finding that uncertainty causes a fall in R&D investments, albeit mitigated by patent 
protection (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011) and firms’ size and market concentration (Czarnitzki 
and Toole, 2013).  
Here we take a more heuristic approach to uncertainty and one that is more data 
driven, with the aim of testing whether firms’ self-reported perception of market uncertainty2 
affects their investment behaviour. Specifically, we examine whether the decision to invest in 
R&D and the amount of investment in R&D are affected by perceptions of these two 
demand-related obstacles over time and we empirically test this within a panel econometrics 
framework, as detailed in the next section.  
Further, an important added value of this paper is the analysis it undertakes of 
possible sectoral differences in the way demand affects firms’ propensity to invest in R&D3. 
Our conjecture is that service firms are substantially more sensitive to the state of demand 
                                                 
2
 As explained in Section 3, information on market uncertainty is based on responses to a specific question 
formulated in terms of whether “uncertain demand for innovative goods or services” is perceived as a barrier to 
innovation. We believe that despite the qualitative, self-report nature of the information provided by this 
question (in common with all CIS-based evidence), it allows us to draw a plausible picture of firms’ responses 
to increasing levels of (perceived) uncertainty.  
3
 In the best tradition of innovation studies, this allows us to control for the role of different technological 
opportunities at the sectoral level and, therefore, to implicitly account for the “technology-push” argument.  
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when planning their innovative strategies. This is in line with much of the literature on 
innovation in services (for a review, see Gallouj and Savona, 2009), which claims that the 
importance of customers and user-producer interactions in services is substantially higher 
than in manufacturing sectors. Accordingly, we empirically test the conjectures above for 
both the whole sample of firms and for sub-samples of different macro-sectors, as explained 
in detail below.  
3. Data  
We draw on firm level data from the Spanish Technological Innovation Panel 
(PITEC), compiled jointly by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), the Spanish 
Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT), and the Foundation for Technical 
Innovation (COTEC). The data are collected in line with the Oslo Manual guidelines (OECD, 
1997) and, as such, they can be considered to constitute a Community Innovation Survey or 
CIS-type dataset. Thus, together with general information about the firm (main industry of 
affiliation, turnover, employment, founding year), PITEC also includes a (much larger) set of 
innovation variables that measure the firms’ engagement in innovation activity, economic and 
non-economic measures of the effects of innovation, self-reported evaluations of factors 
hampering or fostering innovation, participation in cooperative innovation activities and 
some complementary innovation activities such as organisational change and marketing
4
. 
An important feature that distinguishes PITEC from the majority of European CIS-
type datasets is its longitudinal nature. Since 2003 systematic data collection has ensured the 
consistent representativeness of the population of Spanish manufacturing and service firms 
over a number of time periods.  
                                                 
4
 Recent works based on the use of this dataset are López-García, et al. (2013), D’Este et al (2014) and Segarra 
and Teruel (2014) 
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In this study we use data for the period 2004-2011 and select our working database 
from the initial sample (100,016 firm-year observations). First, we discard all firms operating 
in the primary (1,628 observations), construction (3,914 observations), utilities (720 
observations) and sewage/refuse disposal (318 observations) sectors and all firms involved in 
M&A transactions (8,543 observations)
5
. In line with our previous work (D’Este et al., 2008 
and 2012; Pellegrino and Savona, 2013), we then select a relevant sample. To this end, we 
exclude 6,114 observations that refer to “non innovation-oriented firms”, i.e., firms that did 
not introduce any type of innovation (goods, services or processes) and which at the same 
time did not encounter any barriers to innovation during the three-year period, and which we 
therefore infer are not interested in innovating. The resulting sample of 78,779 firm-year 
observations is further reduced by excluding all the missing values for the variables used in 
the empirical analysis (24,315 observations), as well as 354 firms that were observed for just 
one year.    
Table 1 shows the composition of the final dataset following data cleaning. As can be 
seen, half of the 9,132 firms (54,110 observations) included in the final sample are observed 
for all eight periods (2004-2011); about 23% are observed for seven periods while only a 
negligible percentage of firms (around 10%) are observed for less than five years. These 
figures allow us to confirm with confidence the suitability of this dataset for the subsequent 
dynamic analysis. 
< INSERT TABLE 1 > 
                                                 
5
 It is common practice in the innovation literature to focus on private manufacturing and services companies 
and to exclude public utilities and primary activities owing to differences in the regulatory framework in which 
they operate. In the case of M&A transactions, firms were eliminated from the sample in the years following the 
merger or acquisition. 
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4. Econometric strategy and variables 
As discussed above, the main aim of this paper is to assess empirically whether and, if 
so, how demand-related obstacles to innovation affect two important innovative decisions 
taken by firms: their propensity to engage in R&D and, conditional on that, the level of 
investment in R&D. As stressed by a largely consolidated stream of literature, innovation 
and, in particular, R&D activities are processes that present high degrees of cumulativeness 
and irreversibility and, as a result, are characterised by a high level of persistence (see 
Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1960; David, 1985; Dosi, 1988; Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001). This 
evidence is fully supported by our data. Indeed, if we examine the transition probabilities of 
engaging in R&D activities (see Table 2) it emerges that almost 86% of R&D performers in 
one year retained this same status during the subsequent year. This percentage rises to 91% in 
the case of non R&D performers that did not change their status into the next period.  
< INSERT TABLE 2> 
 
This evidence suggests that the use of an autoregressive specification for the two 
decisions taken by a firm in relation to its R&D activities is the most suitable. Accordingly, 
our empirical strategy is based on the estimation of the following two equations:   
 
    
               
                                                                                               ( ) 
    
               
                                                                                               ( ) 
 
where     
  and      
  denote the two latent dependent variables representing respectively firm 
i’s propensity at period t (i = 1,…N; t = 1,….T) to engage in R&D (expressed as a binary 
variable), and firm i’s decision regarding the level of investment to make in R&D activity 
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(the natural logarithm of R&D expenditure). For each firm i,          and         represent the 
one-period lag of the     
  and     
  dependent variables, while   is a vector of explanatory 
variables that has been chosen taking into account both the characteristics of the dataset at 
our disposal and the main insights provided by the literature on the subject.  
More specifically, we first consider a binary indicator of international competition, 
which is equal to 1 if a firm’s most significant market of destination is international and equal 
to 0 otherwise. On the grounds that international markets tend to be characterized by a higher 
level of competition, this variable should exert a positive effect on the firm’s propensity to 
innovate (e.g., Archibugi and Iammarino, 1999; Narula and Zanfei, 2003; Cassiman et al., 
2010). However, some authors (see, for example, Clerides et al., 1998) warn of the possible 
existence of a reverse causation: most innovative firms are more likely to penetrate foreign 
markets and self-select themselves so as to engage in tougher foreign competition. In order to 
deal with this endogeneity issue we consider the one-period lagged value of this variable. 
Reverse causation has also been observed in the relationship between public subsidies 
and innovation activity. Most of the literature on the subject provides empirical support for 
the positive impact of incentive schemes on a firm’s propensity to both engage in and 
undertake R&D (see, for example, Callejon and García-Quevedo, 2005; González et al., 2005 
for the Spanish case). However, other contributions cast some doubt on the reliability of such 
a relationship because of the potential endogeneity of public funding (see, for example, 
Wallsten, 2000). Accordingly, the t-1 value of an indicator of whether the firm has received 
public support for innovation is included. 
A one-period lagged value has also been considered for two indicators of whether the 
firm makes use respectively of patents and informal methods (registration of design, 
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trademarks, copyrights) to protect its innovations
6
. In this case, the rationale is that the 
positive impact of the mechanisms of appropriability used by a firm take time to make 
themselves manifest. 
We also use a variable recording a firm’s age to control for age related effects. The 
theoretical and empirical literatures provide mixed evidence regarding the possible effect of 
age on engagement in/realization of innovation activities. Klepper (1996) provides a 
theoretical model that points to a negative relationship between a firm’s age and its 
probability of innovating. However, as Galande and De la Fuente (2003) point out, a firm’s 
age can also be seen as a proxy of the firm’s knowledge and experience accumulated over 
time and, consequently, it should be positively related to innovation. 
Moreover, in line with various studies that stress the expected innovative benefits for 
a firm that is a member of an industrial group (see Mairesse and Mohnen, 2002), such as 
easier access to finance and positive intra-group knowledge spillovers, we include a dummy 
variable identifying this characteristic. 
A further important factor that might influence a firm’s R&D decision is the business 
cycle. In order to control for this aspect, in line with some recent contributions (see Aghion et 
al., 2012; Lopez Garcia et al., 2013), we use a micro-level perspective to identify 
idiosyncratic shocks to firms by considering firm’s sales growth.  
Finally, following the Schumpeterian tradition, we consider a variable reporting the 
log of the total number of employees as a measure of firm size and a set of industry dummies 
variables (based on the 2-digit CNAE codes
7
).  
In the case of the demand-related obstacles, in line with the discussion in Section 2 
and the rationale underpinning this, we single out two binary variables that identify an 
                                                 
6
 Previous studies generally show a clear-cut, positive link between these factors and a firm’s innovative activity 
(see Levin et al., 1987; Salomon and Shaver, 2005; Liu and Buck, 2007). 
7
 The Spanish industrial classification codes (CNAE) correspond to the European NACE taxonomy. 
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increase (over a yearly base) in the degree of importance (irrelevant, low, medium, high) that 
the firms assign to the following two barriers specified as “uncertain demand for innovative 
goods and services” and “lack of demand for innovation”8. Finally, we control for possible 
additional negative effects of other obstacles to innovation, including a dichotomous variable 
recording an annual increase in the importance of the firm’s level of perception of the 
remaining obstacle categories (cost and knowledge related obstacles, market dominated by 
established firms). Table A1 in the Appendix shows the list of variables, their acronyms and a 
detailed description.  
As for the econometric methodology, in order to estimate equations (1) and (2), we 
apply the method proposed by Wooldridge (2005) based on a conditional maximum 
likelihood estimator. The author proposes a simple solution in order to address the two well-
known problems that might bias the results in a dynamic random effects probit/tobit context: 
the initial condition problem and the correlation between the individual error term and the 
explanatory variables. Specifically, Wooldridge suggests modelling the firm-specific error 
term as follows: 
                    ̅                                                          ( ) 
where  ̅  refers to the within mean of the     vector of explanatory variables and embodies 
the elements that are correlated with    , while      (with j = 1,2) are the initial conditions of 
the dependent variables that are supposed to be correlated with the individual error term. 
The new equations (1) and (2), obtained by replacing the individual error terms     
(with j= 1,2) in the right-hand side of equation 3, are estimated using standard random effects 
                                                 
8
 We opted to use these constructed variables in light of the high within-variation of the obstacle variables. 
However, by construction, the variables take the value 0 in the case of firms persistently assessing the two 
barriers as highly relevant. We therefore perform robustness checks by considering instead two dichotomous 
variables taking the value 1 when a firm evaluates as highly relevant the lack/uncertainty of demand and 0 
otherwise. The results shown in tables A3-A4 and A5 in the Appendix are remarkably consistent with those 
discussed in Section 5.2. 
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probit (equation (1)) and tobit (equation (2), due to the censored nature of R&D expenditure) 
software.  
5. Empirical evidence 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
One of the conjectures forwarded in this paper is that a firm’s sectoral affiliation is a 
major determinant of the nature and dimension of the effects of demand obstacles on its 
innovative behaviour. Following the classification proposed by Eurostat and based on an 
aggregation of NACE manufacturing and service sectors, we identify four macro-categories: 
high/medium-high tech manufacturing industries (HMHt), low/medium-low tech 
manufacturing industries (LMLt), knowledge-intensive services sectors (KIS) and less 
knowledge-intensive services sectors (LKIS). Table 3 depicts the sectoral (2 digit) 
composition and the distribution of these four macro-categories and reports the mean of the 
two demand obstacle variables Lack of demand and Uncertainty for each sector. In terms of 
sectoral composition, there is a slight prevalence of LMLt firms, constituting 35% of the total 
observations, while the remaining 65% of the observations are roughly equally distributed 
among the three other sectoral categories (HMHt, KIS and LKIS). If we consider the sectoral 
frequencies in terms of the macro-categories, around 22% of the LMLt firms operate in the 
food, beverage and tobacco sectors; around 29% of HMHt companies are active in the 
chemical sectors; 35% of KIS firms carry out computer programming activities and, finally, 
36% of the LKIS firms are active in the trade sector. Across these four macro-sectors, almost 
20% of firms have experienced an increase in the degree of importance assigned to demand 
uncertainty, while a lower percentage (around 16%) experienced an increase in the degree of 
importance of the lack of demand as a perceived obstacle. In the case of the sectoral 
categories, no striking differences can be found, with a percentage range running from 13.54 
15
  
(HMHt) to 17.90 (LKIS) for the Uncertainty variable and from 17.39 (HMHt) to 22.26 
(LKIS) for the Lack of demand variable. Overall, these figures reveal a quite high 
responsiveness on the part of firms to changes in the demand condition that can hamper their 
innovation activities. This evidence is further corroborated by the figures in Table 4, which 
report the mean values (in percentages) of the two demand-related obstacles by year and 
sectoral categories. As is apparent, though, these variables show considerable within 
variation.  
 
< INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4> 
 
Our examination of possible sectoral specificities in terms of a firm’s characteristics 
(see Table 5 for the summary statistics – mean and standard deviation – of the variables 
presented above) reveals that some of the differences are in line with expectations. 
Specifically: 1) HMHt and KIS firms appear to be more likely to engage in R&D, to invest 
more in R&D and to have a higher probability of receiving subsidies for their innovation 
activity (in line with the previous discussion) than do the other two categories; 2) firms in the 
manufacturing sectors show a much higher propensity to export than those active in the 
services sectors; 3) while no striking sectoral differences emerge with respect to the firm’s 
propensity to use informal methods of protection (the lowest percentage being associated, as 
expected, with LKIS firms), HMHt firms are much more likely to protect the results of their 
innovation activity by means of patents than are the firms operating in the other sectors (with 
only 5% of LKIS firms resorting to appropriability methods of this type). If we examine the 
remaining variables, on average 37% of the observations refer to firms that are part of an 
industrial group: this percentage ranges from 34% for firms in the LMLt category to 42% for 
those in the MHMt group. Finally, turning to the variable ln(Size) and ln(Age), on average, 
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firms acting in the KIS sectors appear to be younger and smaller than their counterparts in the 
other sectoral categories
9
.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 5> 
 
Table 6 reports the mean values of the variables for the four different firm types 
identified by taking into account their “demand obstacle status”. More specifically we 
distinguish those firms that did not experience an increase in the degree of relevance assigned 
to either of the two obstacles, from those that report an increase in the degree of importance 
of only the lack of demand obstacle; only the uncertainty demand obstacle; or both types of 
demand obstacle. We find that firms belonging to the first category appear to present quite 
distinct characteristics from those presented by firms in any of the remaining groups. 
Specifically, firms that did not report any increase in the degree of relevance assigned to 
either of the two obstacles present higher values for all the variables considered, with the 
exception of the variables of other obstacles and sales growth. In contrast, and as expected, 
firms presenting positive values for the demand obstacle variables appear to be less R&D 
oriented (both in terms of the probability of conducting the activity and the level of 
investment) than their counterparts, and this is particularly true in the case of firms that report 
an increase in the level of importance of the lack of demand obstacle. This evidence is largely 
robust across the four sectoral categories. Albeit solely at the descriptive level, this evidence 
seems to suggest that, regardless of the sector, demand conditions play an important role in 
                                                 
9
 It is worth nothing that, since we use panel data, the revealed negative relationship between R&D and age 
might be due to a survivorship bias. Indeed, as the subsequent surveys can only account for firms that have 
survived until the date of data collection, the probability that the resulting sample may be biased towards the 
more successful companies is not negligible. This could be particularly true for new born and young firms 
which are more likely to be affected by early failure.  
 
17
  
affecting innovative firms’ decisions. We test this in an econometric framework in the next 
section.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 6 > 
 
5.2. Econometric results 
The estimation results for the propensity to engage in R&D (probit estimations) and 
for the amount of expenditure dedicated to R&D (tobit estimations) for the whole sample are 
reported in Table 7. The table shows the estimated parameters of the main variables of 
interest, the demand obstacles, and the control variables.  
The results for the control variables present the expected signs and significance. First, 
both R&D decisions (whether or not to invest and how much to invest) appear to be highly 
persistent over time as the parameters for the initial value and the lagged dependent variables 
are positive and highly significant. Second, in both estimations, the traditional firm 
characteristics affecting decisions related to R&D expenditure present the expected sign. 
Larger firms that conduct business internationally are more likely to carry out R&D activities 
and to devote more resources to them. Moreover, although the literature is not unanimous on 
this point, our results suggest that there is a negative and significant relationship between age 
and R&D, so that younger firms are more likely to carry out R&D activities. Third, other 
variables that characterise the innovation behaviour of firms, including the use of intellectual 
property rights and being recipients of public subsidies, also have a positive effect on R&D 
investments. Finally, while firms with higher levels of sales growth are more likely to engage 
in R&D and to invest more in R&D, the increase in the perception of other obstacles to 
innovation exerts, as expected, a negative and highly significant effect on both decisions 
taken by the firm. 
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The results of the estimations (Tables 8 and 9) are consistent with most of the 
previous results regarding the effect and significance of the control variables across the four 
groups of sectors. The parameters for the initial conditions and the lagged dependent 
variables are positive and significant showing that the likelihood of carrying out R&D and 
R&D investment are highly persistent across different sectors. In addition, as in the 
estimation for the full sample, size and participation in foreign markets present a positive 
relationship with the decision to engage in R&D and the level of investment. Public subsidies 
also show positive and significant parameters across the four groups of sectors. On the other 
hand, age is only significant in the less knowledge-intensive services, showing a negative link 
as in the full-sample estimation. Finally, the negative effect of the variable controlling for 
other obstacles is particularly important in high and medium-high technology manufacturing 
sectors and in knowledge-intensive sectors. 
5.2.1 Uncertainty, lack of demand and R&D strategies  
Turning to our main variables of interest, we find that an increase in the level of 
demand uncertainty for innovative goods or services as perceived by firms does not affect 
their R&D decisions and presents a weak positive relation to the amount of R&D invested. In 
particular, in the sectoral estimations the parameter is not significant and, therefore, an 
increase in uncertainty neither affects the likelihood of engaging in R&D nor the amount 
invested in these activities.  
As discussed in Section 2, the theoretical literature examining the relationship 
between uncertainty and R&D does not offer a conclusive answer. The few empirical studies 
in this field seem to support a negative relationship (Czarnitzki and Toole, 2011 & 2013), 
while in some recent research work (Stein and Stone, 2013) a positive relationship between 
uncertainty and R&D investment has been found, which seems to be (weakly) supported by 
our full-sample estimations. Our results suggest that there might be a defensive strategy in 
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response to an increase in perceived demand uncertainty in terms of firms’ opting to invest or 
opting to devote more of their budget to R&D.  
The weakly positive relation between uncertainty and R&D behaviour might be 
explained by a “caution effect” that leads to a reduction in the responsiveness of R&D to 
changes in business conditions when uncertainty is higher (Bloom, 2007; Bloom et al., 2007). 
Overall, our findings support the (robust) evidence on the persistence over time of R&D 
activities (see also Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001): decisions to invest in R&D therefore seem to 
belong to firms’ structural, long-term strategies. After all, particularly when investing in basic 
research and in the first phases of applied research, returns to R&D are themselves almost by 
definition highly uncertain and in most cases highly risky. Part of the demand uncertainty 
might therefore be already “incorporated” in the strategic horizon of firms’ decisions and 
may even be considered an incentive to face uncertainty by competing in terms of product 
quality.  
In contrast with this result, and interestingly for the purpose of our analysis, the firms’ 
perception of deterioration in demand conditions has a strong and significantly negative 
effect on R&D strategy. Falling or the lack of demand for goods and services not only has a 
negative effect on the amount invested in R&D but also reduces the likelihood of engaging in 
R&D altogether
10
. Although a general stagnation of demand may affect prices and therefore 
lead to a net increase in demand for cheaper innovative products (OECD, 2012), our results 
show that the negative effect is clearly dominant, suggesting that rather than uncertainty with 
regard to the demand for a single product or for a specific portfolio of products, it is the 
general macro-economic condition and, therefore, expectations regarding the aggregate state 
of the economy that affect firms’ R&D strategies. This confirms our conjecture that, 
                                                 
10
 Even when considering the joint effect of the increase in lack and uncertainty of demand, as shown in Table 
2A in the appendix, it clearly emerges that the negative effect of the perceived lack of demand dominates over 
uncertainty, as the net effect is still negative.  
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especially in time of crisis, demand-pull perspectives on innovation should be revisited and 
made better use of for (macro) policy purposes. We will return to these considerations in the 
concluding section.  
< INSERT TABLE 7 > 
5.2.2 Uncertainty, lack of demand and R&D strategies – sectoral specificities 
The estimations carried out for the four groups of sectors (Tables 8 and 9), 
distinguishing between manufacturing and service sectors as well as their respective 
technological content, show that the effect of demand obstacles on R&D investments are 
homogenous across sectors. Our results are therefore robust, confirming that demand 
conditions affect the R&D behaviour in all types of firm, regardless of their sectoral 
affiliation. High demand uncertainty neither affects the likelihood of performing R&D nor 
the amount invested in it, in any of the four sectors. In contrast, deterioration in general 
demand conditions has a negative effect across all four sectors. However, the magnitude of 
these effects is not homogeneous across all sectors. In particular, the reduction in demand has 
a more intense effect on expenditure in R&D in the less knowledge-intensive services. 
< INSERT TABLES 8 AND 9 > 
6. Concluding remarks  
This paper has revived demand-pull perspectives from the point of view of barriers to 
innovation and investigated whether perceptions of a lack of demand and of demand 
uncertainty negatively affect the propensity to invest in R&D and the intensity of the 
financial effort devoted to this activity.  
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Our main conjecture is that the size of the destination market and expectations 
regarding profitability (that is, the perceived lack of demand and of market dynamism) are 
likely to have impacts other than the mere uncertainty regarding the propensity to engage in 
R&D and the intensity of that engagement. While the former reflects a general trust in the 
state of the economy and is, hence, more of a macro-condition that firms need to verify, the 
latter is a micro-condition concerning the specific characteristics of the product and, hence, 
the actual user needs that the product is supposed to satisfy. Our claim, for which we provide 
empirical support, is that a lack of trust in the macro-condition of demand’s dynamism 
represents more of a deterrent for firms to even engage in innovative activities, whereas 
uncertainty regarding the specific demand and user needs, while still being a deterrent, are 
likely to be incorporated in the firms’ specific R&D plans.  
We have found support for this conjecture. From our analysis it emerges that while 
the perception of an increasing lack of demand has a significant, strong and negative effect on 
both the decision to invest and the amount of investment in R&D, increasing demand 
uncertainty does not seem to have any significant effect or to have a weakly significant 
positive effect (Stein and Stone, 2013). Part of the demand uncertainty might therefore be 
already “incorporated” in the strategic horizon of firms’ decisions when they engage in an 
intrinsically risky and uncertain activity such as R&D. 
These findings contribute to the debate on demand-pull and technology-push 
approaches in innovation studies from a radically novel perspective, namely, that of barriers 
to innovation.  
The literature on barriers is increasingly important due to its obvious policy relevance. 
However, much of the scholarship produced to date, with few exceptions, has focused on 
financial barriers, overlooking other important hindrances that firms might face when 
deciding to innovate. Overlooking demand-related obstacles – we argue – reflects the 
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dominance of technology-push perspectives and the way the debate between demand-pull and 
technology-push has been shaped over time (see Di Stefano et al., 2012 for a recent review).  
An exhaustive consideration of the policy implications of these findings goes beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, our results confirm the importance of demand as a strong 
incentive to innovate. We support the need to foster demand-side innovation policies in the 
innovation policy agenda (Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011). Although the role of demand is 
still incipient in innovation policies (Edler and Georghiu, 2007), recent trends show an 
increase in, and a growing emphasis on, the use of demand-side innovation measures (OECD, 
2011; Edler, 2013). These measures may help guarantee markets for new goods and services 
and complement supply-side innovation policy tools to promote innovation efforts and 
performance.   
Finally, our results show that the lack of demand affects negatively the decision to 
invest in R&D for the four groups of sectors considered. Although the sectors differ in terms 
of their innovation dynamics, these results suggest that demand-oriented innovation policies 
may stimulate R&D in all types of industry. Nevertheless, further research is needed to 
analyse in greater detail the reaction of individual industries to the lack of demand and the 
convenience of targeting different sectors with different policy tools.  
  
23
  
References  
Aghion, P., Askenazy, P., Berman, N., Cette, G., Eymard, L., 2012. Credit Constraints 
and the Cyclicality of R&D Investment: Evidence from France. Journal of the European 
Economic Association 10, 1001–1024. 
Archibugi, D., Filippetti, A., 2011. Innovation and Economic Crisis: Lessons and 
Prospects from the Economic Downturn. Routledge. 
Archibugi, D., Iammarino, S., 1999. The Policy Implications of the Globalisation of 
Innovation. Research Policy 28, 317–336. 
Atkinson, A.B., Stiglitz, J.E., 1969. A New View of Technological Change. The 
Economic Journal 79, 573–578. 
Blanchard, P., Huiban, J.-P., Musolesi, A., Sevestre, P., 2012. Where There Is a Will, 
There Is a Way? Assessing the Impact of Obstacles to Innovation. Industrial and Corporate 
Change 22, 679–710. 
Bloom, N., 2007. Uncertainty and the Dynamics of R&D. American Economic Review 
97, 250–255. 
Bloom, N., Bond, S., Reenen, J.V., 2007. Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics. Review 
of Economic Studies 74, 391–415. 
Bond, S., Harhoff, D., Harho, D., Reenen, J.V., 1999. Investment, R&D and Financial 
Constraints in Britain and Germany. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
Cainelli, G., Evangelista, R., Savona, M., 2006. Innovation and economic performance in 
services: a firm-level analysis, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30, 435–58. 
Callejon, M., García-Quevedo, J., 2005. Public Subsidies to Business R&D: Do they 
Stimulate Private Expenditures? Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 23, 
279–293. 
Canepa, A., Stoneman, P., 2008. Financial Constraints to Innovation in the UK: Evidence 
from CIS2 and CIS3. Oxford Economic Papers 60, 711–730. 
Cassiman, B., Golovko, E., Martínez-Ros, E., 2010. Innovation, Exports and 
Productivity. International Journal of Industrial Organization 28, 372–376. 
Cefis, E., Orsenigo, L., 2001. The persistence of innovative activities: A cross-countries 
and cross-sectors comparative analysis. Research Policy 30, 1139–1158. 
Cohen, W.M., 2010. Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity and 
Performance, in: Bronwyn H. Hall and Nathan Rosenberg (Ed.), Handbook of the Economics 
24
  
of Innovation, Handbook of The Economics of Innovation, Vol. 1. North-Holland, pp. 129–
213. 
Czarnitzki, D., Toole, A.A., 2011. Patent Protection, Market Uncertainty, and R&D 
Investment. Review of Economics and Statistics 93, 147–159. 
Czarnitzki, D., Toole, A.A., 2013. The R&D Investment–Uncertainty Relationship: Do 
Strategic Rivalry and Firm Size Matter? Managerial and Decision Economics 34, 15–28. 
D’Este, P., Iammarino, S., Savona, M., von Tunzelmann, N., 2008. What Hampers 
Innovation? Evidence from UK CIS4 SPRU Electronic Working Paper Series (SEWPS), no. 
168 (February). 
D’Este, P., Iammarino, S., Savona, M., von Tunzelmann, N., 2012. What Hampers 
Innovation? Revealed Barriers Versus Deterring Barriers. Research Policy 41, 482–488. 
D’Este, P., Rentocchini, F., Vega-Jurado, J., 2014. The Role of Human Capital in 
Lowering the Barriers to Engaging in Innovation: Evidence from the Spanish Innovation 
Survey. Industry & Innovation 21, 1–19. 
David, P.A., 1985. Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. The American Economic 
Review 75, 332–337. 
Di Stefano, G., Gambardella, A., Verona, G., 2012. Technology push and demand pull 
perspectives in innovation studies: Current findings and future research directions. Research 
Policy 41, 1283–1295. 
Dosi, G., 1982. Technological paradigms and technological trajectories: A suggested 
interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change. Research Policy 11, 
147–162. 
Dosi, G., 1988. Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation. Journal 
of Economic Literature 26, 1120–1171. 
Edler, J., 2013. Review of Policy Measures to Stimulate Private Demand for Innovation. 
Concepts and Effects, Manchester Institute of Innovation Research, University of 
Manchester, January 2013 (http://research.mbs,ac.uk/innovation/). 
Edler, J., Georghiu, L. 2007. Public procurement and innovation. Resurrecting the 
demand side. Research Policy 36, 949-963. 
Fontana, R., Guerzoni, M., 2008. Incentives and uncertainty: an empirical analysis of the 
impact of demand on innovation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 32, 927–946. 
Galende, J., de la Fuente, J.M., 2003. Internal Factors Determining a Firm’s Innovative 
Behaviour. Research Policy 32, 715–736. 
25
  
Galia, F., Legros, D., 2004. Complementarities between Obstacles to Innovation: 
Evidence from France. Research Policy 33, 1185–1199. 
Gallouj, F., Savona, M., 2009. Innovation in services: a review of the debate and a 
research agenda. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 19, 149–172. 
González, X., Jaumandreu, J., Pazó, C., 2005. Barriers to Innovation and Subsidy 
Effectiveness. The RAND Journal of Economics 36, 930–950. 
Hall, B.H., 2002. The Financing of Research and Development. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 18, 35–51. 
Hottenrott, H., Peters, B., 2011. Innovative Capability and Financing Constraints for 
Innovation: More Money, More Innovation? Review of Economics and Statistics 94, 1126–
1142. 
Iammarino, S., Sanna-Randaccio, R., Savona, M., 2009. The Perception of Obstacles to 
Innovation. Foreign Multinationals and Domestic Firms in Italy. Revue d’économie 
industrielle 125, 75–104. 
Kleinknecht, A., Verspagen, B., 1990. Demand and Innovation: Schmookler Re-
examined. Research Policy 19, 387–394. 
Klepper, S., 1996. Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life Cycle. The 
American Economic Review 86, 562–583. 
Levin, R.C., Klevorick, A.K., Nelson, R.R., Winter, S.G., Gilbert, R., 1987. 
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 3, 783–831. 
Liu, X., Buck, T., 2007. Innovation Performance and Channels for International 
Technology Spillovers: Evidence from Chinese High-tech Industries. Research Policy 36, 
355–366. 
López-García, P., Montero, J.M., Moral-Benito, E., 2013. Business Cycles and 
Investment in Productivity-Enhancing Activities: Evidence from Spanish Firms. Industry & 
Innovation 20, 611–636. 
Mairesse, J., Mohnen, P., 2002. Accounting for Innovation and Measuring 
Innovativeness: An Illustrative Framework and an Application. The American Economic 
Review 92, 226–230. 
Mancusi, M.L., Vezzulli, A., 2010. R&D, Innovation, and Liquidity Constraints. KITeS 
Working Papers 30/2010, Bocconi University. 
Meyers, S., Marquis, D.G., 1969. Successful industrial innovation: critical factors for the 
1990s. National Science Foundation, Washington, DC. 
26
  
Mowery, D., Rosenberg, N., 1979. The Influence of Market Demand Upon Innovation: a 
Critical Review of some Recent Empirical Studies. Research Policy 8, 102–153. 
Mundlak, Y., 1978. On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data. Econometrica 
46, 69–85. 
Narula, R., Zanfei, A., 2003. The International Dimension of Innovation, in: Fagerberg, 
J., Mowery, D.C., Nelson, R.R. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, pp. 318–345. 
OECD, 2011. Demand-side Innovation Policies. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
OECD, 2012. Innovation in the crisis and beyond, in: OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Outlook. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Pellegrino, G., Savona, M., 2013. Is money all? Financing versus knowledge and demand 
constraints to innovation. UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 029. 
Piva, M., Vivarelli, M., 2007. Is Demand-pulled Innovation Equally Important in 
Different Groups of Firms? Cambridge Journal of Economics 31, 691–710. 
Salomon, R.M., Shaver, J.M., 2005. Learning by Exporting: New Insights from 
Examining Firm Innovation. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 14, 431–460. 
Savignac, F., 2008. Impact of Financial Constraints on Innovation: What Can Be Learned 
from a Direct Measure? Economics of Innovation and New Technology 17, 553–569. 
Schiantarelli, F., 1996. Financial Constraints and Investment: Methodological Issues and 
International Evidence. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 12, 70–89. 
Schmookler, J., 1962. Economic Sources of Inventive Activity. The Journal of Economic 
History 22, 1–20. 
Schmookler, J., 1966. Invention and Economic Growth. Harvard University Press, MA. 
Segarra, A., Teruel, M., 2014. High-growth firms and innovation: an empirical analysis 
for Spanish firms. Small Business Economics 1–17. 
Stein, L., Stone, E. 2013. The effect of uncertainty on investment, hiring and R&D: 
Causal evidence from equity options, mineo. 
Tiwari, A., Mohnen, P., Palm, F., Schim van der Loeff, S., 2008. Financial Constraint 
and R&D Investment: Evidence from CIS, in: Determinants of Innovative Behaviours: A 
Firm’s Internal Practice and Its External Environments. London, pp. 217–242. 
Von Hippel, E., 1978. Successful Industrial Products from Customer Ideas. Journal of 
Marketing 42, 39. 
27
  
Von Hippel, E., 1982. Appropriability of innovation benefit as a predictor of the source 
of innovation. Research Policy 11, 95–115. 
Von Tunzelmann, N., Wang, Q., 2003. An Evolutionary View of Dynamic Capabilities. 
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 6, 33–64. 
Wallsten, S.J., 2000. The Effects of Government-Industry R&D Programs on Private 
R&D: The Case of the Small Business Innovation Research Program. The RAND Journal of 
Economics 31, 82–100. 
Wooldridge, J.M., 2005. Simple Solutions to the Initial Conditions Problem in Dynamic, 
Nonlinear Panel Data Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity. Journal of Applied 
Econometrics 20, 39–54. 
28
   
Table 1. Composition of the panel 
     
Time obs. N° of firms % % Cum N° of obs. 
2 384 4.26 4.26 768 
3 511 5.55 9.81 1,533 
4 647 7.08 16.89 2,588 
5 893 9.85 26.74 4,465 
6 2,123 23.25 49.99 12,738 
7 4,574 50.01 100.00 32,018 
Total 9,132 100  54,110 
Note: the final sample only comprises firms for which a lag of the 
dependent variable is available. This implies that t=2 refers to 
firms that are observed for at least three periods, t=3 corresponds 
to firms that are observed for four periods and so on. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Transition probabilities: R&D performers 
    
P
er
fo
rm
er
 i
n
 t
-1
  Performer in t 
 R&D 
 0 1 
0 90.95 9.05 
1 14.15 85.85 
Total 43.98 56.02 
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Table 3. Sectoral composition for macro categories (relative frequencies) and percentage of 
firms that experienced an increase in the degree of importance of the demand (uncertainty 
and lack) related obstacles 
 
  
Freq. For 
category 
% over  
category  
% over  
total 
Incr. in lack 
of demand 
Incr. in 
uncertainty 
demand    
Low/Med-Low 18,730 100.00 34.61 16.27 19.87 
Petroleum 39 0.21 0.07 10.26 20.51 
Food products beverages, tobacco 4,109 21.94 7.59 16.50 19.96 
Textiles 1,180 6.30 2.18 13.90 16.86 
Wearing apparel 370 1.98 0.68 14.32 24.32 
Leather -products, footwear 359 1.91 0.66 19.50 18.38 
Wood-products, cork 599 3.20 1.11 20.03 24.71 
Pulp/paper-products 546 2.92 1.01 13.00 16.12 
Rubber and plastics 1,981 10.57 3.66 14.89 19.59 
Mineral products (no metallic) 1,736 9.27 3.21 17.40 20.68 
Basic metals 955 5.10 1.76 16.65 20.52 
Fabricated metal products 3,464 18.49 6.40 17.26 20.84 
Furniture 1,119 5.98 2.07 18.77 21.00 
Other manufacturing n.e.c. 1,835 9.80 3.39 14.39 18.37 
Repair of fabricated metal products 438 2.34 0.81 13.47 19.86 
High/Med-High  11,736 100.00 21.69 13.54 17.39 
Chemicals 3,364 28.67 6.22 12.90 16.59 
Pharmaceutical 909 7.75 1.68 10.34 16.50 
Electronic, optical, computer products 1,049 8.94 1.94 12.96 17.35 
Electrical equipment 1,265 10.77 2.34 13.20 18.02 
Other machinery 3,540 30.17 6.54 15.31 17.91 
Motor vehicles 1,274 10.86 2.35 13.19 18.29 
Aerospace 143 1.21 0.26 13.29 15.38 
Other transport equipment 192 1.64 0.35 15.10 17.71 
KIS  11,942 100.00 22.07 15.26 19.58 
Telecommunications 312 2.61 0.58 13.46 22.12 
Computer programming activities 4,207 35.24 7.77 15.43 20.25 
Other inform. and communication serv. 951 7.96 1.76 18.30 22.08 
Financial intermediation, insurance 1,086 9.09 2.01 15.29 17.03 
Research and development services 1,678 14.05 3.10 11.98 17.10 
Other activities* 3,505 29.34 6.48 19.60 19.80 
Education 203 1.70 0.38 15.76 20.20 
LKIS  11,702 100.00 21.63 17.90 22.26 
Trade 4,236 36.20 7.83 16.34 20.87 
Passenger transport, warehousing  1,153 9.86 2.13 20.29 23.42 
Hotels and Restaurants 708 6.04 1.31 17.37 23.73 
Real Estate 317 2.71 0.59 19.87 22.71 
Public administration and auxiliary serv. 3,186 27.22 5.89 17.92 23.07 
Other service activities** 2,102 17.97 3.88 8.52 22.65 
TOTAL 54,110   100.00 15.81 19.78 
*  Legal activities; Activities of head offices; Architectural activities; Advertising agencies; Specialised 
design activities; Veterinary activities. 
** Washing and (dry-)cleaning of textile and fur products; Repair of computers and peripheral equipment. 
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Table 4. Percentage of firms that report an increase in the degree of importance of the demand (uncertainty and 
lack) related obstacles. (by year and sectoral categories)  
               
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Un. 
Dem. 
Lack 
Dem. 
Low/Med-Low 24.07 18.80 19.92 16.80 19.14 13.91 20.50 17.25 19.15 15.33 18.58 16.73 17.98 15.44 
High/Med-High 20.00 16.91 17.69 13.32 17.00 11.98 18.07 14.23 16.90 11.54 16.79 13.88 15.25 13.38 
KIS 24.37 17.76 20.86 15.47 19.17 14.59 19.96 16.27 17.74 15.45 17.36 14.23 18.38 13.27 
LKIS 26.57 20.28 23.52 20.57 20.37 15.28 25.11 18.16 20.36 17.86 19.87 16.54 20.43 16.88 
Total 23.73 18.47 20.40 16.54 18.95 13.94 20.87 16.59 18.61 15.09 18.21 15.51 18.03 14.84 
Observations 6,616 8,524 8,439 8,229 7,931 7,459 6,912 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation of the variables; all firms and 4 sectoral categories 
           
  All firms  Low/Med-low High/Med-high Kis Lkis 
 Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd 
ln(R&D)  7.20 6.21 6.92 6.05 9.62 5.52 8.43 6.17 3.95 5.67 
R&D dummy 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.77 0.42 0.66 0.47 0.33 0.47 
R&D dummy t-1 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.80 0.40 0.70 0.46 0.37 0.48 
Lack of demand  0.16 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 
Uncertainty 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42 
ln(Age) 3.06 0.65 3.19 0.62 3.20 0.63 2.77 0.66 3.02 0.61 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.63 0.48 0.77 0.42 0.85 0.36 0.43 0.50 0.37 0.48 
Industrial group 0.37 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Patent dummy t-1 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.22 
Informal protection dummy t-1 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.38 
ln(Size) 4.10 1.56 4.05 1.29 4.08 1.34 3.66 1.67 4.65 1.87 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.22 0.42 
Sales growth 0.00 0.59 -0.01 0.42 0.00 0.51 0.02 0.78 0.00 0.66 
Other obstacles 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Observation 54,110 18,730 11,736 11,942 11,702 
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Table  6. Descriptive statistics: mean of the variables by sectoral categories and by obstacles variables status (whole sample, LMLt, HMHt) 
            
  All the sample Low/Med-low High/Med-high 
 No-
obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack of 
Dem. 
Both 
Obst 
No-
obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack 
of 
Dem. 
Both 
Obst 
No-
obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack 
of 
Dem. 
Both 
Obst 
 
ln(R&D)  7.65 6.87 5.34 5.57 7.36 6.70 5.11 5.37 10.01 9.35 7.43 8.15 
R&D dummy 0.62 0.56 0.44 0.46 0.61 0.55 0.43 0.46 0.79 0.74 0.61 0.67 
R&D dummy t-1 0.65 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.65 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.73 
ln(Age) 3.08 3.01 3.01 3.04 3.20 3.14 3.14 3.18 3.22 3.16 3.16 3.14 
Lack of demand  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Uncertainty 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.65 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.86 0.83 0.82 0.78 
Industrial group 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.39 
Patent dummy t-1 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Informal protection dummy t-1 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.24 
ln(Size) 4.14 4.05 3.94 4.06 4.10 3.99 3.81 3.96 4.12 4.07 3.87 3.91 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.37 
Sales growth 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 
Other obstacles 0.40 0.60 0.74 0.54 0.41 0.61 0.74 0.54 0.39 0.64 0.73 0.51 
Observation 38,244 7,313 5,161 3,392 13,198 2,485 1,811 1,236 8,733 1,414 962 627 
% 70.68 13.52 9.54 6.27 70.46 13.27 9.67 6.60 74.41 12.05 8.20 5.34 
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Table  6 (continued) -  Descriptive statistics: mean of the variables by sectoral categories and by obstacles variables status (Kis and LKIS)  
 
  Kis Lkis 
 
No-obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack of 
Dem. 
Both Obst No-obst. 
Uncer. 
Dem. 
Lack of 
Dem. 
Both Obst 
 
ln(R&D)  8.77 8.40 6.84 6.94 4.31 3.75 2.80 2.73 
R&D dummy 0.69 0.67 0.55 0.55 0.36 0.31 0.24 0.24 
R&D dummy t-1 0.72 0.70 0.65 0.62 0.39 0.32 0.35 0.33 
ln(Age) 2.80 2.70 2.70 2.78 3.04 2.99 2.99 2.97 
Lack of demand  0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Uncertainty 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Exporter dummy t-1 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Industrial group 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.38 0.38 
Patent dummy t-1 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Informal protection dummy t-1 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.15 
ln(Size) 3.71 3.53 3.50 3.67 4.67 4.62 4.56 4.65 
Subsidy dummy t-1 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.39 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.19 
Sales growth 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.02 
Other obstacles 0.40 0.64 0.74 0.59 0.40 0.50 0.75 0.52 
Observation 8,491 1,629 1,113 709 7,822 1,785 1,275 820 
% 71.1 13.64 9.32 5.94 66.84 15.25 10.9 7.01 
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Table 7. Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations for the whole sample  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 
0.263***  0.268***  
(0.005)  (0.005)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.229***  0.219***  
(0.008)  (0.008)  
Ln (R&D) t-1 
 0.696***  0.701*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Ln (R&D) t0 
 0.469***  0.458*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Uncertainty 
0.002 0.146**   
(0.004) (0.066)   
Lack of demand 
  -0.070*** -1.256*** 
  (0.004) (0.074) 
ln(Age) 
-0.003 -0.169** -0.003 -0.173** 
(0.004) (0.078) (0.004) (0.077) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 
0.061*** 0.984*** 0.060*** 0.967*** 
(0.005) (0.086) (0.005) (0.085) 
Industrial group 
0.013*** 0.118 0.013*** 0.124 
(0.005) (0.090) (0.005) (0.089) 
Patent dummy  t-1 
0.039*** 0.228** 0.039*** 0.225** 
(0.007) (0.095) (0.007) (0.094) 
Informal protection dummy  t-1 
0.033*** 0.478*** 0.031*** 0.463*** 
(0.005) (0.073) (0.005) (0.073) 
ln(Size) 
0.036*** 0.575*** 0.034*** 0.558*** 
(0.002) (0.036) (0.002) (0.036) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 
0.053*** 0.569*** 0.052*** 0.562*** 
(0.004) (0.069) (0.004) (0.068) 
Sales growth 
0.019*** 0.315*** 0.018*** 0.305*** 
(0.003) (0.044) (0.003) (0.044) 
Other obstacles 
-0.024*** -0.260*** -0.017*** -0.143*** 
(0.003) (0.054) (0.003) (0.054) 
Constant 
 -8.560***  -8.156*** 
 (0.350)  (0.345) 
N° of observations 54,110 31,558 54,110 31,558 
Log likelihood -18,349.36 -110,152.19 -18,230.76 -115,420.97 
σu 
0.829*** 3.286*** 0.804*** 7.466*** 
(0.025) (0.063) (0.025) (0.080) 
ρ 0.407*** 0.311*** 0.393*** 0.700*** 
LR test for Rho 741.549 2,759.567 676.358 8,805.801 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and 
industry dummies are included. Columns 1-3 report marginal effects. 
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Table 8. Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations for Manufacturing sectors (Low/medium and High/medium tech  
sectors) 
 
 Low/medium-low tech Sectors  High/medium-high tech Sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln 
(R&D) 
R&D Dummy   t-1 
0.299***  0.303***  0.215***  0.220***  
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
R&D Dummy   t 0 
0.236***  0.225***  0.183***  0.174***  
(0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Ln (R&D) t-1 
 0.723***  0.729***  0.652***  0.657*** 
 (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Ln (R&D) t 0 
 0.425***  0.414***  0.301***  0.292*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Uncertainty 
0.001 0.184   0.001 0.084   
(0.007) (0.118)   (0.007) (0.105)   
Lack of demand 
  -0.082*** -1.401***   -0.060*** -1.038*** 
  (0.008) (0.133)   (0.008) (0.120) 
ln(Age) 
0.000 -0.052 0.001 -0.047 0.001 -0.093 0.001 -0.093 
(0.008) (0.131) (0.007) (0.129) (0.008) (0.114) (0.008) (0.112) 
Exporter dummy t-1 
0.083*** 1.544*** 0.080*** 1.525*** 0.058*** 1.004*** 0.056*** 0.980*** 
(0.009) (0.166) (0.009) (0.165) (0.010) (0.162) (0.010) (0.160) 
Industrial group 
0.032*** 0.403** 0.031*** 0.405** -0.014 -0.270* -0.014 -0.261* 
(0.010) (0.163) (0.010) (0.161) (0.010) (0.143) (0.010) (0.142) 
Patent dummy t-1 
0.051*** 0.429** 0.049*** 0.413** 0.025** 0.111 0.026** 0.120 
(0.012) (0.170) (0.012) (0.169) (0.011) (0.128) (0.011) (0.127) 
Informal protection 
dummy t-1 
0.035*** 0.503*** 0.033*** 0.484*** 0.037*** 0.453*** 0.036*** 0.442*** 
(0.009) (0.133) (0.009) (0.132) (0.009) (0.112) (0.009) (0.112) 
ln(Size) 
0.064*** 1.025*** 0.062*** 0.993*** 0.049*** 0.697*** 0.047*** 0.676*** 
(0.005) (0.075) (0.004) (0.074) (0.005) (0.068) (0.005) (0.067) 
Subsidy dummy t-1 
0.043*** 0.460*** 0.043*** 0.461*** 0.034*** 0.264*** 0.034*** 0.264*** 
(0.007) (0.118) (0.007) (0.118) (0.008) (0.102) (0.007) (0.101) 
Sales growth 
0.020*** 0.369*** 0.019*** 0.359*** 0.013** 0.260*** 0.012** 0.244*** 
(0.007) (0.115) (0.007) (0.114) (0.005) (0.079) (0.005) (0.079) 
Other obstacles 
-0.013** -0.080 -0.006 0.045 -0.042*** -0.442*** -0.037*** -0.363*** 
(0.006) (0.097) (0.006) (0.097) (0.006) (0.084) (0.006) (0.083) 
Constant 
 -10.892***  -10.493***  -4.502***  -4.175*** 
 (0.703)  (0.691)  (0.673)  (0.662) 
N° of observations 18,730 10,774 18,730 10,774 11,736 8,985 11,736 8,985 
Log likelihood -6,962.85 -38,630.89 -6,906.97 -38,575.79 -3,444.10 -27,914.75 -3,414.47 -27,877.33 
σu 
0.813*** 3.398*** 0.783*** 3.318*** 0.896*** 2.375*** 0.857*** 2.318*** 
(0.039) (0.111) (0.039) (0.112) (0.061) (0.097) (0.061) (0.097) 
ρ 0.398*** 0.297*** 0.380*** 0.288*** 0.446*** 0.278*** 0.423*** 0.268*** 
LR test for Rho 279.950 935.581 250.348 885.615 148.184 604.328 129.396 566.990 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and 
industry dummies are included. Columns 1-3-5-7 report marginal effects. 
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Table 9. Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations for services sectors (KIS and LKIS) 
 
 KIS LKIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy   t-1 
0.275***  0.278***  0.233***  0.237***  
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
R&D Dummy   t 0 
0.175***  0.168***  0.244***  0.234***  
(0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  
 0.715***  0.717***  0.773***  0.782*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Ln (R&D) t 0 
 0.336***  0.330***  0.804***  0.784*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
Uncertainty 
0.002 0.077   0.006 0.327   
(0.008) (0.125)   (0.008) (0.229)   
Lack of demand 
  -0.050*** -0.790***   -0.074*** -2.215*** 
  (0.009) (0.143)   (0.009) (0.262) 
ln(Age) 
-0.008 -0.210 -0.009 -0.222 -0.026*** -0.968*** -0.027*** -0.979*** 
(0.009) (0.156) (0.009) (0.155) (0.009) (0.280) (0.008) (0.275) 
Exporter dummy t-1 
0.032*** 0.309** 0.031*** 0.300** 0.049*** 1.154*** 0.048*** 1.133*** 
(0.009) (0.136) (0.009) (0.135) (0.009) (0.283) (0.009) (0.280) 
Industrial group 
-0.023** -0.403** -0.022** -0.396** 0.018* 0.541* 0.018* 0.548* 
(0.011) (0.168) (0.011) (0.167) (0.010) (0.305) (0.010) (0.301) 
Patent dummy t-1 
0.011 -0.094 0.012 -0.088 0.065*** 1.051** 0.063*** 1.018** 
(0.014) (0.187) (0.014) (0.186) (0.017) (0.419) (0.017) (0.416) 
Informal protection 
dummy t-1 
0.028*** 0.354*** 0.027*** 0.341** 0.024** 0.540** 0.023** 0.526* 
(0.009) (0.134) (0.009) (0.134) (0.010) (0.275) (0.010) (0.273) 
ln(Size) 
0.034*** 0.555*** 0.033*** 0.549*** 0.019*** 0.528*** 0.018*** 0.515*** 
(0.004) (0.065) (0.004) (0.065) (0.003) (0.101) (0.003) (0.100) 
Subsidy dummy t-1 
0.066*** 0.744*** 0.065*** 0.731*** 0.068*** 1.368*** 0.067*** 1.348*** 
(0.008) (0.137) (0.008) (0.137) (0.009) (0.263) (0.009) (0.261) 
Sales growth 
0.022*** 0.339*** 0.021*** 0.332*** 0.013** 0.317** 0.012** 0.314** 
(0.004) (0.065) (0.004) (0.065) (0.005) (0.131) (0.005) (0.131) 
Other obstacles 
-0.031*** -0.346*** -0.025*** -0.260** -0.014** -0.195 -0.006 0.039 
(0.007) (0.104) (0.007) (0.104) (0.007) (0.196) (0.007) (0.197) 
Constant 
 -5.819***  -5.608***  -11.614***  -10.979*** 
 (0.770)  (0.763)  (0.996)  (0.977) 
N° of observations 11,942 7,919 11,942 7,919 11,702 3,880 11,702 3,880 
Log likelihood -3,990.23 -26,751.98 -3,973.86 -26,736.80 -3,806.35 -15,858.81 -3,770.68 -15,823.30 
σu 
0.758*** 2.808*** 0.734*** 2.769*** 0.806*** 5.131*** 0.778*** 5.005*** 
(0.052) (0.120) (0.052) (0.121) (0.053) (0.235) (0.053) (0.234) 
ρ 0.365*** 0.267*** 0.350*** 0.262*** 0.394*** 0.365*** 0.377*** 0.355*** 
LR test for Rho 126.762 546.201 114.697 525.103 152.728 478.487 137.003 457.777 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and 
industry dummies are included. Columns 1-3-5-7 report marginal effects.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1. The variables: acronyms and definitions. 
 
 
Dependent variables (Innovative Inputs) 
R&D dummy Dummy =1 if firm’s R&D (both internal and external) expenditures are 
positive 
ln(R&D)  Natural log of the total firm’s expenditures in R&D (both internal and 
external) 
  
Independent variables (control variables) 
ln(Age) Natural log of the firm’s age (calculated as years elapsed since founding) 
 
Exporter dummy  Dummy =1 if the firm have traded in an international market during the 
three year period; 0 otherwise 
 
Industrial group Dummy =1 if the firm is part of an industrial group, 0 otherwise 
Patent dummy Dummy=1 if the firm uses patents; 0 otherwise 
 
Informal 
protection dummy  
Dummy=1 if the firm adopts others instruments of protection than patents; 
0 otherwise 
 
ln(Size) Log of the total number of firm’s employees 
 
Subsidy dummy Dummy = 1 if the firm has received public support for innovation; 0 
otherwise 
Sales growth Growth rates of sales (calculated by taking logarithmic differences of sales 
levels) 
 
Other obstacles Dummy=1 if the firm reports an higher degree of importance (from period t 
to period t+1) for at least one of the remaining obstacles variables; 0 
otherwise 
 
Independent variables (Obstacle demand variables) 
Lack of demand  Dummy=1 if the firm reports an higher degree of importance (from period t 
to period t+1) for the obstacles variables “it was not necessary to innovate 
due to the Lack of demand for innovation”; 0 otherwise 
 
Uncertainty Dummy=1 if the firm reports an higher degree of importance (from period t 
to period t+1) for the obstacles variables “Uncertain demand for innovative 
goods or services”; 0 otherwise 
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Table A2. Robustness check: Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations with both the demand obstacles variable 
      
 Whole Sample LMLt  HMHt KIS  LKIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 
0.264***  0.300***  0.216***  0.275***  0.234***  
(0.005)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.010)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.227***  0.233***  0.181***  0.173***  0.240***  
(0.008)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  
Ln (R&D) t-1 
 0.696***  0.724***  0.652***  0.715***  0.775*** 
 (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.032) 
Ln (R&D) t0 
 0.466***  0.422***  0.299***  0.335***  0.796*** 
 (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.044) 
ln(Age) 
-0.003 -0.171** 0.000 -0.052 0.001 -0.094 -0.008 -0.212 -0.027*** -0.987*** 
(0.004) (0.077) (0.008) (0.131) (0.008) (0.114) (0.009) (0.156) (0.009) (0.278) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 
0.061*** 0.973*** 0.082*** 1.530*** 0.057*** 0.991*** 0.031*** 0.304** 0.049*** 1.156*** 
(0.005) (0.086) (0.009) (0.166) (0.010) (0.161) (0.009) (0.136) (0.009) (0.282) 
Industrial group 
0.013*** 0.121 0.032*** 0.407** -0.014 -0.268* -0.023** -0.401** 0.018* 0.533* 
(0.005) (0.090) (0.010) (0.163) (0.010) (0.143) (0.011) (0.168) (0.010) (0.304) 
Patent dummy  t-1 
0.039*** 0.224** 0.050*** 0.420** 0.025** 0.110 0.011 -0.092 0.064*** 1.032** 
(0.007) (0.095) (0.012) (0.170) (0.011) (0.128) (0.014) (0.187) (0.017) (0.418) 
Informal protection dummy  t-1 
0.032*** 0.470*** 0.034*** 0.493*** 0.037*** 0.451*** 0.028*** 0.347*** 0.023** 0.522* 
(0.005) (0.073) (0.009) (0.133) (0.009) (0.112) (0.009) (0.134) (0.010) (0.275) 
ln(Size) 
0.036*** 0.572*** 0.064*** 1.019*** 0.049*** 0.695*** 0.034*** 0.554*** 0.019*** 0.522*** 
(0.002) (0.036) (0.005) (0.075) (0.005) (0.068) (0.004) (0.065) (0.003) (0.101) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 
0.053*** 0.567*** 0.043*** 0.463*** 0.034*** 0.265*** 0.066*** 0.739*** 0.068*** 1.358*** 
(0.004) (0.069) (0.007) (0.118) (0.008) (0.102) (0.008) (0.137) (0.009) (0.262) 
Sales growth 
0.018*** 0.315*** 0.021*** 0.375*** 0.013** 0.257*** 0.022*** 0.337*** 0.013*** 0.331** 
(0.003) (0.044) (0.007) (0.115) (0.005) (0.079) (0.004) (0.065) (0.005) (0.131) 
Demand obstacles 
-0.040*** -0.645*** -0.046*** -0.729*** -0.024** -0.345* -0.025* -0.293 -0.056*** -1.660*** 
(0.006) (0.111) (0.011) (0.196) (0.012) (0.180) (0.013) (0.217) (0.013) (0.397) 
Other obstacles 
-0.024*** -0.248*** -0.014** -0.068 -0.042*** -0.438*** -0.030*** -0.334*** -0.015** -0.184 
(0.003) (0.054) (0.006) (0.097) (0.006) (0.083) (0.007) (0.103) (0.007) (0.196) 
Constant 
 -8.428***  -10.749***  -4.429***  -5.767***  -11.272*** 
 (0.348)  (0.699)  (0.671)  (0.768)  (0.988) 
N° of observations 54,110 31,558 18,730 10,774 11,736 8,985 11,942 7,919 11,702 3,880 
Log likelihood -18,329.66 -110,278.72 -6,954.99 -38,625.14 -3,442.05 -27,913.23 -3,988.48 -26,751.25 -3,797.46 -15,850.89 
σu 
0.821*** 3.339*** 0.805*** 3.378*** 0.890*** 2.367*** 0.753*** 2.802*** 0.797*** 5.093*** 
(0.025) (0.062) (0.039) (0.111) (0.061) (0.097) (0.052) (0.120) (0.053) (0.235) 
ρ 0.403*** 0.317*** 0.393*** 0.295*** 0.442*** 0.276*** 0.362*** 0.266*** 0.388*** 0.361*** 
LR test for Rho 719.478 2,853.464 271.269 920.858 144.563 597.539 123.517 541.750 147.587 471.681 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and industry dummies are included. Columns 1-3 report marginal 
effects 
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Table A3. Robustness check: Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations with the obstacles variables identifying those firms 
assessing as highly important the lack/uncertainty of demand (whole sample).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) R&D Dummy Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy  t-1 
0.263***  0.263***  
(0.005)  (0.005)  
R&D Dummy  t0 
0.229***  0.214***  
(0.008)  (0.008)  
Ln (R&D) t-1 
 0.695***  0.697*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010) 
Ln (R&D) t0 
 0.469***  0.447*** 
 (0.013)  (0.013) 
Uncertainty (high) 
-0.003 -0.075   
(0.004) (0.072)   
Lack of demand (high) 
  -0.155*** -3.684*** 
  (0.008) (0.152) 
ln(Age) 
-0.003 -0.170** -0.001 -0.148* 
(0.004) (0.078) (0.004) (0.076) 
Exporter dummy  t-1 
0.061*** 0.980*** 0.058*** 0.929*** 
(0.005) (0.086) (0.005) (0.085) 
Industrial group 
0.013** 0.117 0.012** 0.103 
(0.005) (0.090) (0.005) (0.089) 
Patent dummy  t-1 
0.039*** 0.226** 0.038*** 0.222** 
(0.007) (0.095) (0.006) (0.094) 
Informal protection dummy  t-1 
0.033*** 0.475*** 0.031*** 0.450*** 
(0.005) (0.073) (0.005) (0.073) 
ln(Size) 
0.036*** 0.573*** 0.034*** 0.558*** 
(0.002) (0.036) (0.002) (0.035) 
Subsidy dummy  t-1 
0.053*** 0.569*** 0.050*** 0.538*** 
(0.004) (0.069) (0.004) (0.068) 
Sales growth 
0.019*** 0.316*** 0.017*** 0.298*** 
(0.003) (0.044) (0.003) (0.044) 
Other obstacles 
-0.024*** -0.251*** -0.024*** -0.251*** 
(0.003) (0.054) (0.003) (0.054) 
Constant 
 -8.498***  -8.020*** 
 (0.349)  (0.342) 
N° of observations 54,110 31,558 54,110 31,558 
Log likelihood -18,349.30 -110,295.05 -18,135.34 -109,984.6 
σu 
0.829*** 3.353*** 0.800*** 3.244*** 
(0.025) (0.062) (0.024) (0.062) 
ρ 0.407*** 0.319*** 0.390*** 0.306*** 
LR test for Rho 741.687 2,886.465 690.512 2,734.302 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and 
industry dummies are included. Columns 1-3 report marginal effects. 
  
39
   
Table A4. Robustness check: Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations with the obstacles variables identifying those firms 
assessing as highly important the lack/uncertainty of demand (manufacturing sectors). 
 
 Low/medium-low tech Sectors  High/medium-high tech Sectors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy   t-1 
0.299***  0.297***  0.215***  0.219***  
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
R&D Dummy   t 0 
0.236***  0.219***  0.183***  0.171***  
(0.015)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.017)  
Ln (R&D) t-1 
 0.723***  0.724***  0.651***  0.657*** 
 (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Ln (R&D) t 0 
 0.425***  0.404***  0.301***  0.286*** 
 (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Uncertainty (high) 
0.000 -0.006   -0.003 -0.090   
(0.008) (0.128)   (0.008) (0.110)   
Lack of demand 
(high) 
  -0.186*** -4.163***   -0.110*** -2.553*** 
  (0.014) (0.272)   (0.015) (0.266) 
ln(Age) 
0.000 -0.054 0.002 -0.018 0.001 -0.092 0.001 -0.088 
(0.008) (0.131) (0.007) (0.129) (0.008) (0.114) (0.008) (0.112) 
Exporter dummy t-1 
0.083*** 1.539*** 0.077*** 1.458*** 0.058*** 0.999*** 0.057*** 1.000*** 
(0.009) (0.166) (0.009) (0.164) (0.010) (0.162) (0.010) (0.160) 
Industrial group 
0.032*** 0.405** 0.032*** 0.424*** -0.014 -0.272* -0.016 -0.297** 
(0.010) (0.163) (0.010) (0.161) (0.010) (0.143) (0.010) (0.141) 
Patent dummy t-1 
0.051*** 0.426** 0.047*** 0.386** 0.025** 0.109 0.025** 0.119 
(0.012) (0.170) (0.012) (0.168) (0.011) (0.128) (0.011) (0.127) 
Informal protection 
dummy t-1 
0.035*** 0.500*** 0.033*** 0.494*** 0.037*** 0.452*** 0.035*** 0.417*** 
(0.009) (0.133) (0.008) (0.132) (0.009) (0.112) (0.009) (0.112) 
ln(Size) 
0.064*** 1.024*** 0.060*** 0.974*** 0.049*** 0.694*** 0.047*** 0.680*** 
(0.005) (0.075) (0.004) (0.074) (0.005) (0.068) (0.005) (0.067) 
Subsidy dummy t-1 
0.043*** 0.460*** 0.039*** 0.413*** 0.034*** 0.265*** 0.032*** 0.245** 
(0.007) (0.118) (0.007) (0.117) (0.008) (0.102) (0.007) (0.101) 
Sales growth 
0.020*** 0.371*** 0.018** 0.342*** 0.013** 0.258*** 0.013** 0.253*** 
(0.007) (0.115) (0.007) (0.115) (0.005) (0.079) (0.005) (0.079) 
Other obstacles 
-0.013** -0.069 -0.014** -0.083 -0.042*** -0.438*** -0.042*** -0.440*** 
(0.006) (0.097) (0.006) (0.097) (0.006) (0.083) (0.006) (0.083) 
Constant 
 -10.833***  -10.277***  -4.455***  -4.196*** 
 (0.702)  (0.688)  (0.673)  (0.658) 
N° of observations 18,730 10,774 18,730 10,774 11,736 8,985 11,736 8,985 
Log likelihood -6,962.87 -38,632.12 -6,874.53 -38,506.78 -3,444.01 -27,914.74 -3,417.22 -27,867.77 
σu 
0.813*** 3.398*** 0.783*** 3.280*** 0.898*** 2.377*** 0.854*** 2.294*** 
(0.039) (0.111) (0.038) (0.110) (0.061) (0.097) (0.060) (0.097) 
ρ 0.398*** 0.297*** 0.380*** 0.284*** 0.446*** 0.278*** 0.422*** 0.264*** 
LR test for Rho 279.635 934.860 262.300 891.461 148.547 604.306 132.658 556.862 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and industry 
dummies are included. Columns 1-3-5-7 report marginal effects. 
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Table A5. Robustness check: Dynamic RE probit and tobit estimations with the obstacles variables identifying those firms assessing as 
highly important the lack/uncertainty of demand (services sectors). 
 
 KIS LKIS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) R&D 
Dummy 
Ln (R&D) 
R&D Dummy   t-1 
0.275***  0.272***  0.232***  0.230***  
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.010)  
R&D Dummy   t 0 
0.175***  0.167***  0.244***  0.229***  
(0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016)  
Ln (R&D) t-1  
 0.714***  0.711***  0.771***  0.767*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
Ln (R&D) t 0 
 0.336***  0.327***  0.803***  0.762*** 
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.043) 
Uncertainty (high) 
-0.004 -0.121   -0.002 -0.024   
(0.009) (0.135)   (0.010) (0.284)   
Lack of demand 
(high) 
  -0.133*** -2.841***   -0.162*** -5.660*** 
  (0.016) (0.295)   (0.016) (0.491) 
ln(Age) 
-0.008 -0.212 -0.007 -0.183 -0.026*** -0.973*** -0.025*** -0.944*** 
(0.009) (0.156) (0.009) (0.154) (0.009) (0.280) (0.008) (0.274) 
Exporter dummy t-1 
0.031*** 0.304** 0.029*** 0.271** 0.049*** 1.156*** 0.045*** 1.056*** 
(0.009) (0.136) (0.009) (0.135) (0.009) (0.283) (0.009) (0.279) 
Industrial group 
-0.023** -0.406** -0.022** -0.394** 0.018* 0.541* 0.016* 0.478 
(0.011) (0.168) (0.011) (0.167) (0.010) (0.305) (0.010) (0.301) 
Patent dummy t-1 
0.011 -0.090 0.009 -0.096 0.065*** 1.053** 0.067*** 1.126*** 
(0.014) (0.187) (0.014) (0.186) (0.017) (0.419) (0.016) (0.414) 
Informal protection 
dummy t-1 
0.028*** 0.353*** 0.027*** 0.337** 0.024** 0.531* 0.021** 0.465* 
(0.009) (0.134) (0.009) (0.134) (0.010) (0.275) (0.010) (0.272) 
ln(Size) 
0.034*** 0.553*** 0.033*** 0.543*** 0.019*** 0.526*** 0.018*** 0.524*** 
(0.004) (0.065) (0.004) (0.064) (0.003) (0.102) (0.003) (0.100) 
Subsidy dummy t-1 
0.066*** 0.747*** 0.065*** 0.731*** 0.068*** 1.364*** 0.065*** 1.315*** 
(0.008) (0.137) (0.008) (0.136) (0.009) (0.263) (0.009) (0.260) 
Sales growth 
0.022*** 0.339*** 0.021*** 0.330*** 0.013** 0.323** 0.011** 0.279** 
(0.004) (0.065) (0.004) (0.065) (0.005) (0.132) (0.005) (0.130) 
Other obstacles 
-0.031*** -0.341*** -0.030*** -0.337*** -0.014** -0.183 -0.013* -0.127 
(0.007) (0.103) (0.007) (0.103) (0.007) (0.196) (0.007) (0.195) 
Constant 
 -5.762***  -5.527***  -11.491***  -10.694*** 
 (0.770)  (0.760)  (0.994)  (0.973) 
N° of observations 11,942 7,919 11,942 7,919 11,702 3,880 11,702 3,880 
Log likelihood -3,990.17 -26,751.76 -3,955.99 -26,704.35 -3,806.61 -15,859.82 -3,744.65 -15,784.26 
σu 
0.759*** 2.808*** 0.741*** 2.752*** 0.806*** 5.130*** 0.786*** 4.961*** 
(0.052) (0.120) (0.051) (0.120) (0.053) (0.235) (0.052) (0.232) 
ρ 0.365*** 0.267*** 0.354*** 0.260*** 0.394*** 0.364*** 0.382*** 0.352*** 
LR test for Rho 126.781 545.907 122.008 529.891 152.299 477.609 144.365 457.093 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes; ***, ** and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. Time and 
industry dummies are included. Columns 1-3-5-7 report marginal effects. 
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